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This case seems to indicate also that the court has extended
the doctrine of apportionment to instrumentalities of interstate
commerce which visit a state sporadically and for only fractional periods of the year. 26 Perhaps the only guides in the future
application and possible extension of the doctrine are (1) under
the commerce clause, what portion of an interstate organization
" 'may appropriately be attributed to each of the various states
in which it functions,' ",27 and (2) under the due process clause,
" 'whether the tax in practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the tax-

ing state.'
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DIVORCE AND SEPARATION-INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE JURISDICTIONAL BASEs-DoMIcnLE OF WIFE-Husband and wife were

married in 1930, established their matrimonial domicile in Ascension Parish, and lived together in that parish until 1947. In July,
1947, the wife left her husband and moved to the home of her sister in Orleans Parish. In April, 1948, she filed a suit for separation
from bed and board in the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans, alleging cruelty. Citation issued, and the husband was
served at his domicile in Ascension Parish. Exceptions to the
jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione personae of the Orleans
District Court were sustained. Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, alleging that her husband's cruelty had privileged her to
establish a separate domicile in Orleans Parish; that she had
taken with her to that parish the marital res (marital relationship); and therefore that the Orleans Parish Court acquired jurisdiction over the marital status, regardless of the domicile of the
26. "It is said in this case that the visits of the vessels to Louisiana were

sporadic and for fractional periods of the year only and that there was no
average number of vessels in the state every day. The District Court indeed
said that there was no showing that the particular portion of the property
sought to be taxed was regularly and habitually used and employed in Louisiana for the whole of the taxable year." Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 69 S.Ct. 432,- 435 (U.S. 1949). See note 1, supra. The court would
not resolve this question (or these contentions) on the ground that the appellees had not exhausted their state administrative and judicial remedies.

See also headnotes 1 and 3, p. 432.
27. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 69 S.Ct. 432, 434 (U.S. 1949).

28. Ibid. In view of (1) the conclusion of the court under the facts involved, (2) the -broad language of the court (e.g., at p. 435, "We can see no
reason which should put water transportation on a different constitutional
footing than any other interstate enterprises."), and (3) the concurrence if
eight members of the court in contrast to the four diverse opinions of the
Northwest case, It seems likely that the doctrine of apportionment will be extended also to the taxation of the remaining important instrumentality of
interstate commerce-aircraft.
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NOTES

defendant. The district court reversed itself and overruled the
exceptions. On appeal the supreme court sustained the exceptions, holding (1) that defendant must be sued at his own domicile, as provided by Article 162 of the Code of Practice; (2) that
since the marital domicile was in Ascension Parish and the cause
of action arose there, the court of that parish had jurisdiction;
and (3) that Louisiana has never recognized that a wife could
establish a separate domicile if the cause of action arose in this
state and the parties were both domiciled here. Hymel v. Hymel,
37 So. (2d) 813 (La. 1948).
Although the result reached in this case is undoubtedly
correct, both the argument of the wife on motion for rehearing
and the second reason offered by the court as the basis for the
decision exhibit confusion as to the requirements of interstate
and intrastate jurisdiction.
The res theory of divorce jurisdiction had its origin and justification in the necessity for developing a basis for determining
interstate divorce and separation jurisdiction sufficient to insure
full faith and credit. The traditional theory is that full faith and
credit must be given if the court has jurisdiction; and if the court
has jurisdiction, it then applies the law of the state in which it
sits. Perhaps a better way of expressing this is to say that only
a state which has legislative jurisdiction' may allow its courts to
hear the case. The res theory of divorce and separation cases
then appears to be a means of determining this legislative jurisdiction. Until 1942, it was thought the state of matrimonial domicile alone had the res, 2 but now any state in which either party
is domiciled has the res and therefore legislative jurisdiction.3
The problem of finding the res to determine legislative jurisdiction does not arise in intrastate divorce and separation cases,
even if the spouses are considered domiciled in different parishes,
because there can be no question of legislative jurisdiction. Obviously, the laws of the state will apply regardless of the parishes
in which the parties may be domiciled. The problem of determining the parish to be the site of the action involves no question of full faith and credit, and therefore the state rules governing divorce jurisdiction should apply. In Louisiana the court of
1. Legislative jurisdiction with regard to a person or thing may be said to
exist when a state has the power to enact and enforce laws affecting the
legal status of that person or thing.
2. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 21 S.Ct. 544, 45 L.Ed. 794 (1901);
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867 (1906).
3. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279
(1942), noted in (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 319.
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the parish of defendant's domicile has jurisdiction over divorce
and separation suits. 4 Therefore, in cases involving exclusively
intrastate or inter-parish elements, the only necessity for determining the domicile of either party is to determine the parish in
which the suit must be filed.
In determining the domicile of the wife, the supreme court
consistently has applied Article 39 of the Civil Code,5 which
states that the wife has no domicile other than that of her husband. Though by way of dictum often mentioning the possibility
of a contrary conclusion, 6 the supreme court invariably has refused to allow a wife to establish a separate domicile in cases7
involving intrastate or inter-parish jurisdictional questions
Indeed, if the wife were allowed to establish a separate domicile
because of the husband's cruel treatment, it would be necessary
to decide the merits of the case in order to determine in which
parish the suit should be brought. Because of the necessity of insuring full faith and credit in interstate cases, however, the court
has allowed a wife to establish a domicile in this state when her
husband was domiciled in another.8 But these decisions and the
reasons underlying them should never be confused with those
cases involving only intrastate or inter-parish jurisdictional
issues.
THOMAS
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LABOR LAW-VALIDITY OF STATE LAWS BANNING THE UNION

SECURITY CONTRACT-A North Carolina statute' and a Nebraska
constitutional amendment 2 providing that no person be denied an
opportunity to obtain employment because he is or is not a member of a labor organization and forbidding employers from entering into contracts or agreements obligating themselves to exclude
4. Art. 162, La. Civil Code of 1870.

5. Art. 39, La. Civil Code of 1870: "A married woman has no other domicile than that of her husband."
6. Laiche v. His Wife, 156 La. 165, 100 So. 292 (1924); McGee v. Gasery,
185 La. 839, 171 So. 49 (1936); Bruno v Mauro, 205 La. 209, 17 So.(2d) 253

(1944).
7. Evans v. Saul & His Wife, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 247 (La. 1829); Glaude v.
Peat, 43 La. Ann. 161, 8 So. 884 (1891); Laiche v. His Wife, 156 La. 165, 100
So. 292 (1924); Switzer v. Elmer, 172 La. 850, 135 So. 608 (1931); McGee v.
Gasery, 185 La. 839, 171 So. 49 (1936).
8. Champon v. Champon, 40 La. Ann. 28, 3 So. 397 (1888); Smith v. Smith,
43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 So. 248 (1891); George v. George, 143 La. 1032, 79 So.
832 (1918); Zinko v. Zinko, 204 La. 478, 15 So.(2d) 859 (1943); Burgan v. Burgan, 207 La. 1057, 22 So.(2d) 649 (1945).
1. N.C. Laws (1947) c. 328, § 2.
2. Neb. Const. Art. XV, § 13, as adopted in 1946.

